How Ford ‘Fixed’ A Deadly Problem With A Sticker To Dodge The Biggest Recall In History

Twenty-three million vehicles. Even today, that would be enough to give Ford the unenviable title of having one of the worst automotive recalls of all time. Back in the early 1980s, though, this would have been the biggest recall in history, though somehow Ford managed to dodge this such a bullet for the price of a few measly stickers.

Jump back to the 1960s. The automatic transmission was becoming increasingly popular, and column shifters were all the rage. All you had to do was reach behind the wheel to slot the gearbox into park, reverse, or drive. They offered great convenience and plenty of extra room in the cabin compared to floor shifters, and were pretty much the standard across a great number of normal, non-sporty models from the Big Three automakers.

Ford loved the column shifter as much as anybody else, but there was a problem. A significant number of owners were pulling up and parking their cars, only to see them rolling away moments later. Injuries would mount, fatalities too—and eventually, Ford would have to face some kind of music.

Park It, Hard

Shifting the transmission into Park is often enough to keep the vehicle from rolling away. That’s because there’s a little pawl in the transmission that locks the drivetrain in place, stopping the wheels from turning. However, the parking pawl wasn’t historically intended to fully hold the vehicle on its own, especially on a slope. As explained by AAMCO Transmissions, the parking brake should always be applied. “Unfortunately today many drivers to get to their parking space, put the car in park, and go about their day, [and] this puts an unnecessary strain on the transmission, especially on an incline,” notes the company. Regardless, automatic vehicle drivers have come to just rely on shifting into Park to hold a vehicle in place, because in most cases, the parking pawl does a good enough job. (And many modern cars will automatically apply the electric park brake when in park. -DT].

This behavior become a problem for Ford. Starting with models built in the mid-1960s, the company’s automatic transmissions would sometimes be found to go into Reverse when they were meant to be in Park. Owners would pull to a stop, shift into Park, and exit the vehicle. Under these conditions, a dangerous mishap could occur. “The alleged problem with the transmissions is that a safety defect permits them to slip accidentally from park to reverse,” noted the Center for Automotive Safety. If this happened while the vehicle was switched off, it would perhaps roll away if parked on a slope. If the vehicle was left running, the vehicle could accelerate at speed, backwards, potentially hitting somebody or something.

This sounds like a big problem with a high potential to cause injuries or even death. Thus, you might think that Ford quickly tackled this with an engineering fix and everything was sorted. But that wasn’t the case.

Part of the issue was that it took some time before Ford became aware of the problem. When 1971 rolled around, complaints were trickling in. As covered by Fordification, with millions of automatic Fords on the road, the company identified 40 reports made from 1968 to 1971. Ford engineers were looking at the problem by this point, but largely put it down to user error. It was possible to mis-position the shift lever somewhere between the proper Park and Reverse positions, and in these cases, it was easy for the shifter to then slip into Reverse.

At this time, Ford’s owners manuals started to included stricter instructions that drivers should always use the parking brake. Those instructions reminded owners to ensure the shifter had been pushed as far as possible in the counter-clockwise direction to lock it into Park, and to never leave the vehicle running when unattended.

In reality, the problem was that it was just easy to misplace the shifter such that it appeared to be in Park without fully being engaged. In this condition, it was quite easy for the transmission to slip from Park to Reverse, and if the parking brake wasn’t engaged, this could be a significant problem. In the case of Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, expert witness Walter Reed testified on how easily this could happen. As covered in records of the judge’s opinion on the case, Reed claimed that simple engine vibration or slamming a door were enough to knock an FMX transmission from a misplaced Park position into Reverse. Meanwhile, the judge also noted testimony from Ford’s engineer about the transmission behavior:

One of Ford’s engineers, Mr. King, testified as follows regarding the design of the FMX transmission: When the entire transmission system was connected, the Ford and GM transmissions were comparable. If one placed the lever in Park, it would stay there; however, if it was not put all the way into Park, it could move either to Park or Reverse because there was nothing to restrain it. Engine vibration or slamming the door could cause it to move either to Park or Reverse.

When the lever in the FMX transmission is left on the gatepost [between Park and Reverse], the design is such that both the gravity of the linkage and the design of the roostercomb are trying to shift the car into Reverse. When King tapped the lever on a Ford five or six times, it would drop into Reverse, and the back-up lights would come on.

The issue could also be exacerbated by wear. In Ford’s column shifters, a small metal lockout plate was used to hold the shifter in Park. To shift out of Park and into Reverse, one was supposed to pull the shifter towards themselves before sliding it sideways to change gear. However, the detent in the lockout plate can wear over time, as many owners have found. As it rounds off, it became easier for the shifter to be misplaced and slide from P to R.

By 1977, the matter came to the attention of NHTSA. This was thanks to the lobbying efforts of the Center for Automotive Safety (CAS), the non-profit advocacy group founded by Ralph Nader. The group began petitioning NHTSA based on reports from owners of Fords built from 1966 onwards, featuring the C6 and FMX automatic transmissions. These covered a wide range of Ford vehicles, like the Torino, Fairlane, Bronco, and Mustang. Initially, there was little action by the federal agency, and the group renewed its demand for a recall a year later, armed with evidence of 100 alleged accidents and 12 alleged deaths associated with the park-to-reverse issue.

In late 1978, NHTSA issued a “consumer advisory” warning instructing owners of affected Fords to never leave their vehicles unattended with the engine running. However, the agency officially denied a recall for the matter. Regardless, an investigation was begun to understand the depth of the issue. An engineering study was undertaken by NHTSA, though the reports have been lost to time. According to The Center of Auto Safety, though, which was lobbying hard for action on the matter, the results were damning:

The following month NHTSA conducted an investigation to find out if complaints against Ford transmissions were disproportionately higher than those against other manufacturers or whether the problem was common for all automatic transmissions. The study revealed, contrary to Ford’s contentions, that Ford transmissions were 12 times more likely than General Motors’ and 14 times more likely than Chryslers’ to jump from park-to-reverse when jarred.

As later reported by the Government Accountability Office:

The definitions used by NHTSA do not exclude the possibility that so called “human factors” were involved in the accidents that have been reported. However, in NHTSA’s only official engineering study of inadvertent vehicle movement, the agency typified Ford’s 1970-1979 C3, C4, C6, FMX, and JATCO transmissions as “unforgiving” of driver error when shifting into park. The 1980 ODI investigative report said the designs of other manufacturers are likely more tolerant of mechanical imperfections and human frailties than these five Ford transmissions because the forces in other transmissions tend to push them in the direction of Park rather than away from Park and into Reverse. Thus the 1980 report states that the phenomenon of inadvertent vehicle movement seems to result from a combination of design problems and human factors.

As time went on, the problem became yet more prominent.  By 1980, NHTSA had become aware that the issue was impacting Fords built with C3, C4, C6, FMX, and JATCO transmissions built at various times from 1966 to 1979, as covered by the Center for Automotive Safety (CAS). If you had a Ford car or truck with an automatic transmission, there was a solid chance it was at risk of this problem. The issue affected Mercury and Lincoln, too. At this point, CAS had recorded a total of 88 deaths, and it continued to pressure NHTSA to act. The agency also sourced a leaked internal memo from Ford, which explained how the shifter could be misplaced despite the indicator suggesting that the transmission was actually in Park.

In late 1979, Ford finally made an engineering change to solve the problem. As reported by The Boston Globe, Ford officials stated the redesign “will make transmission shift lever placements between Park and Reverse somewhat more difficult.” The aim was to eliminate the risk of drivers not fully seating the vehicle in Park, which was what made it easier for the transmission to slip into reverse.

The numbers were stacking up against Ford. Media coverage across the country was suggesting that the company had known about the problem since 1972 and failed to act. Things seemed likely to tip against the company come August 1980, when NHTSA Administrator Joan Claybrook recommended that Ford recall a full 10 million vehicles to remedy the issue, with the memo preserved in legal records concerning the Center for Auto Safety:

Subject to your approval I intend to make a final determination that all 1970-1979 Ford vehicles equipped with FMX, C-3 and C-4 automatic transmissions contain a defect which relates to motor vehicle safety and to order Ford Motor Company to remedy its 1973-1979 vehicles equipped with these transmissions, as required by the Traffic Safety Act. Approximately ten million vehicles in service would be affected by this order. If this recall follows prior patterns, approximately half of these vehicles will actually receive the necessary repair.

Per The Washington Post, the estimated cost to Ford was $130 million, equal to $500 million in 2025 dollars. This would have instantly become the biggest recall of all time, though eventually it would have been eclipsed by the Takata airbag recalls of the last decade, which has covered approximately 63 million vehicles worldwide.

And yet, Ford managed to dodge the costly recall, saving it millions amidst a challenging time for the US auto industry. As reported by The Washington Post in 1981, Transportation Secretary Neil Goldschmidt would overrule the decision, allowing Ford to instead pursue a far cheaper solution. Goldschmidt’s reasoning was that the Michigan automaker simply couldn’t afford a recall at a time when the Big Three were already losing billions as the Malaise Era raged on. As per UPI, Ford had already lost $1.5 billion in 1980 due to difficult trading conditions, which was then a record for US-based corporation. With the Department of Transportation overruling NHTSA, Ford hoped to save millions.

Instead of a recall, Ford would mail out stickers to owners of all affected vehicles—23 million in total.  Owners were instructed to place these stickers in a prominent position on the dashboard, sun visor, steering wheel, or driver’s door.  The stickers instructed the driver to always ensure the gear selector was fully engaged in the Park position, and to set the parking brake fully and turn off the ignition prior to leaving the driver’s seat.

The stickers got Ford off the hook. As covered by The New York Times in 1983, NHTSA considered the mailout program to be effective. The agency provided statistics that showed deaths from Ford’s transmissions issue had declined from 1.5 deaths per month prior to December 1980, down to 0.9 deaths per month over a period ending January 1983.

The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) continued to lobby NHTSA to force a recall for several years, but to no avail. As the agency itself explains, petitions were submitted to NHTSA to reopen the case in 1981 and 1982, but were repeatedly denied. Similarly, CAS made a direct appeal to Ford to execute a voluntary recall, which fell on deaf ears. By 1985, deaths reported by the Government Accountability Office stood at 446 fatalities. At this time, CAS appealed to NHTSA once more to reopen the case. Regardless, in July that same year, NHTSA announced that it refused to revisit the issue or take any further action.

Meanwhile, news outlets continued to report that Ford had apparently been aware of a redesign that would solve the problem as early as 1972—for the cost of just 3 cents per vehicle, according to lawyers suing Ford, as reported by The New York Times. Covering this widely reported story, the outlet also spoke to a Ford engineer who claimed to have created a solution of his own at a cost of $10 per vehicle. This was a sizable sum in an era when new Fords retailed for just a few thousand dollars. George Morris worked at Ford until 1980, and had discussed his device with executives, who ultimately passed on the idea. From the New York Times:

Mr. Morris, who retired from Ford in 1980 after 24 years of service, said he was present at a meeting early last year when Ford executives discussed his device, which he developed after his retirement while working as a consultant to Ford.

At that meeting, he said, an official in the company’s vehicle safety department said, ”We really don’t need this. Our problem is that people just don’t put the lever all the way into park.”

Mr. Morris said he responded, ”If people just don’t put it into park, why do we have these tremendous settlements in and out of court?”

Assessing the issue in 1985, the Government Accountability Office noted that NHTSA had initially found a safety issue. Regardless, the agency stopped short of outright making a determination that there was a defect. It also criticised NHTSA for its weak analysis on whether the sticker mailout campaign was working. From the agency’s report:

NHTSA conducted an extensive 3-year investigation into the so-called “park-to-reverse” problem in Fords and made an initial determination in June 1980 that a safety-related defect existed. It did not make a final determination of a safety defect and order a vehicle recall but, rather, referred its recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation. Without accepting or rejecting the initial determination, the Secretary negotiated a settlement with Ford. Under the settlement, Ford agreed to mail letters and reminder labels to over 22 million vehicle owners to encourage them to use proper parking procedures before exiting their vehicles. In the letter to Ford accepting the settlement, DOT stated its belief that Ford’s actions would be likely to significantly reduce the occurrence of fatalities and other incidents related to inadvertent vehicle movement.

GAO found that NHTSA has not performed the statistical analysis necessary to measure the settlement’s effectiveness. Also, GAO found that while the incident data showed a decline in the rate of incidents since the settlement, the fatality data showed no overall decline in the rate of fatalities over the same period.

Ford might have hoped to save money by not making physical changes the affected vehicles, but it still ended up paying a hefty cost. A stream of over 1,000 lawsuits from affected owners ran through the courts, with Ford paying out hefty damages in some cases and settling in others. One jury verdict alone awarded a victim’s family $4.4 million, including $4 million in punitive damages, after a woman was run over by her runway Ford and killed, as per The New York Times. In another tragic case covered by the Times, Ford settled for $2 million with a family whose father was killed when he tried to stop his parked Ford from rolling down the driveway. According to the Center for Automotive Safety, Ford would eventually file documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission that indicated it spent over $1.7 billion on lawsuits relating to the park-to-reverse matter.

Ultimately, Ford figured out how to build transmissions and shifters that wouldn’t pop out of Park and into Reverse. As reported in the Boston Globe, tweaks made to the design ensured it was much harder to accidentally position the shifter in between Park and Reverse. When fully latched into Park, the shifter would stay there, and the Park-to-Reverse problem was solved.

According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Ford made these changes to create a “more pronounced” shift feel. However, the GAO noted that NHTSA considered that they were made to rectify an actual defect. As per the agency’s report:

In 1980 Ford made several design changes to its automatic transmissions that it said were design refinements intended to make shift-lever move- ment “more pronounced,” it said, in order to help drivers notice when they fail to complete a shift into park. NHTSA, however, in its 1980 ODI investigative report, said these changes were intended to correct a defective design in the earlier transmissions and not merely added as a driver aid.

Although we did not attempt any engineering analysis of the design changes, we did review the comparative numbers of fatal acci- dent reports on file at NHTSA for 1970-79 model year Fords versus l981- 84 model year Fords.5 As of June 27, 1985, NHTSA had on file 259 fatality cases involving 1970- 79 model year Fords that had been judged to be either “yes” or “pos- sible” inadvertent vehicle movement fatalities. Only four cases had been reported and counted as “yes” or “possible” on 1981-84 Fords. When the total numbers of vehicles produced for these two sets of model years are factored in, the reported fatality rate for 1970-79 Fords is greater than the rate for 1981-84 Fords.

Ford continued to insist that the issue was due to drivers failing to fully place their vehicles in Park, and that other makes had similar issues. [Ed Note: I had this same issue with my 1986 Jeep Grand Wagoneer, which featured a Saginaw Steering column shared with many General Motors cars. So column-shift issues in general definitely weren’t specific to Ford. -DT].  In 1986, Ford provided comment to the Government Accountability Office on the matter. Notable extracts include:

-The Canadian Ministry of Transport conducted an investigation of Ford’s automatic transmissions parallel to NHTSA’s. Its principle investigating contractor concluded “It is not believed that a vehicle in proper mechanical condition would jump from Park to Reverse after properly being placed in Park. It appears in almost all reported incidents, the transmission was not fully shifted into Park.”

-A report prepared by NHTSA’s test facility concluded that when the shift selector was in the Park position, no amount of door slamming, vehicle bouncing, or steering wheel shock, caused the gear selector to jump into reverse.”

-As in all automatic transmission-equipped vehicles, if a Ford shift lever is placed in the Park position, it cannot come out unless moved by the driver. In short, it is now widely accepted that unexpected vehicle movement may occur only when a driver fails to place a vehicle in the Park position in the first place and then compounds this error by failing to turn off the engine and apply the parking brake.

While the official position was that there was no defect, Ford had still seen fit to make the aforementioned changes to its vehicles from the 1980 model year onwards. As much as it blamed drivers for misplacing their shifters not entirely in Park, it was still able to help solve the issue going forward by making it harder to misshift between Park and Reverse.

The fleet of affected vehicles slowly dwindled by natural attrition, and the automotive world moved on. Still, the issue lingers on, now solely in the classic car world. Posts from forum users driving old Ford cars and trucks can be found reporting on this issue to this day.

It’s a sad tale of a serious issue that Ford quite literally stuck a band-aid over.

Image credits: Ford, North East Classic Ford Parts